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NOTE
IF A PUBLIC SCHOOL IS LABELED "FAILING,"
COULD MORE REALLY BE LESS?
Richard T. Weicher*
INTRODUCTION
In its latest word on permissible forms of government aid to relig-
ious educational institutions, Mitchell v. Helms,1 the United States Su-
preme Court agreed on some of the general principles that should be
a part of any analysis of a government aid program under the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution.2 Most important for
purposes of this Note, the members of the Court agreed that one sig-
nificant factor in an analysis of such a program was whether the pro-
gram distributes aid that reaches religious institutions only through
the genuine and independent private choices of individuals. 3
What it means, however, to have a "true independent and private
choice ' 4 is not yet completely clear, particularly in the context of
* Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2001; B.A., The College of the Holy
Cross, 1998. I would like to thank Professors Steven Smith and Richard Garnett for
their assistance with this Note. I would also like to thank Mary Ann MacLaughlan, my
family, and my friends for their support while I worked on this project. Last, many
thanks to the members of the Notre Dame Law Review for their outstanding work on
this Note.
1 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
2 See infra Part III.
3 See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 807-08 (plurality opinion). Justice O'Connor, in a
concurrence in whichJustice Breyerjoined, agreed that whether an independent pri-
vate choice directed government aid to a religious choice was a significant factor for
the Court to consider. See id. at 841 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Souter dis-
sented, with Justices Stevens and Ginsburg joining, and also recognized the impor-
tance of independent and private choices in a First Amendment analysis. See id. at
889 (Souter, J., dissenting).
4 This term is from Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Mitchell See id. at
843 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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school choice voucher programs. Recently, in Jackson v. Benson5 and
Simmons-Harris v. Zelman,6 two different courts, one state and one fed-
eral, considered the meaning of this phrase when they were evaluating
the constitutionality of similar school choice voucher programs. One
of the most important similarities between the two programs was that
the states' legislatures had designed the programs to give parents the
option of sending their children to schools other than "failing' 7 pub-
lic schools in their school districts.8 In Jackson, the Supreme Court of
the State of Wisconsin found its state's program permissible under the
First Amendment to the United States Constitution, while in Zelman,
the Sixth Circuit concluded that Ohio's program was not.9 Although
a number of factors contributed to each decision, the two courts
agreed on one general principle: when the government creates
voucher programs that give parents the opportunity to send their chil-
dren to either sectarian schools or non-sectarian schools, a genuine
and independent private choice exists for purposes of the First
Amendment.
The two courts probably would disagree, however, about whether
a genuine and independent choice exists in a specific instance: when,
for instance, a government creates a voucher program designed to
give parents the option of sending their children to schools other
than failing public schools, but the only options under the program
are a failing public school (or schools) and sectarian schools. In other
words, because of the nature of the schools, there are no public schools
parents could choose under the program which are also not "failing."
From its opinion in Jackson, it is likely that Wisconsin's Supreme Court
would find that such a school does offer an option, while on the other
hand, from its opinion in Simmons-Harris, the Sixth Circuit would not
count such a school as an option.
Assuming that the existence of a genuine and independent pri-
vate choice remains an important factor under the Religion Clauses of
the First Amendment, whether such a choice exists in the situation
5 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis. 1998). Although Jackson was decided before Mitchel the
similarity of the program the Wisconsin Supreme Court evaluated to the program in
Simmons-Harris makes it very useful for this discussion, as does its analysis of indepen-
dent and private choice. See infra Part V.
6 234 F.3d 945 (6th Cir. 2000), cert. granted, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, No.
00-1751, 2001 WL 575830 (U.S. Sept. 25, 2001).
7 What it means for a school to be "failing" is unclear, as is how such a determi-
nation should be made, and by whom. These issues will also be discussed in this note.
See infra Part V.
8 See infra Part V.
9 See infra Part V.
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described above should be of great significance in determining the
constitutionality of many voucher programs for this reason: school
choice voucher programs have begun, and probably will continue to
be most likely to arise, in areas where a state legislature or other gov-
ernmental body has concluded that public schools are failing.'0
This Note will argue that when a voucher program offers only a
failing public school and sectarian schools as options, a genuine and
independent private choice still exists for purposes of the First
Amendment; indeed, a choice clearly exists even though one of the
alternatives may be less desirable. Part I of thii Note will address two
of the primary theories about the meaning of the First Amendment,
and the significance that individual and private choice will have for
each theory. Part II will describe the emergence and meaning of in-
dependent private choice as an important factor under the relevant
United States Supreme Court's First Amendment decisions, followed
by a discussion of Mitchell and its importance in Part III. Relying on
the principles developed by the Court, Part IV will compare and con-
trast Jackson and Simmons-Harris and will argue that the Sixth Circuit
and the Wisconsin Supreme Court disagree about the permissibility of
the example discussed above under the First Amendment. Part V will
demonstrate that there are a number of reasons to find that such a
program provides a genuine and independent private choice under
the First Amendment.
I. Two FIRST AMiENDMENT PERSPECTIVES: "No AID"
AND "NON-DISCRIMINATION"
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."" Although many individu-
als may agree on some of the general concepts embedded in this
amendment, the application of these concepts to various real-life cir-
cumstances has traditionally involved a good deal of dispute. In par-
ticular, it has been difficult for many to agree on the proper
10 See Michael W. McConnell, Governments, Families, and Power: A Defense of Educa-
tional Choice, 31 CONN. L. REV. 847, 847 (1999) ("[E]ducational choice has recently
been embraced with particular enthusiasm by inner city parents, as a response to the
failure of the public educational establishment to meet their children's needs."); see
also David Miles, Gov. Vows To Keep Pressuring Legislature for School Vouchers, ALBUQUER-
QUEJ.,July 17, 2001, at C3; Leslie Postal & Denise-Marie Balona, Parents Weigh Broader
Usefor Vouchers, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Feb. 20, 2001, at BI.
11 U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
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application of this amendment to government aid programs. 12 At the
outset, therefore, it will be useful to describe two general theories
about the meaning of the First Amendment's religion clauses because
these perspectives, and the tension between them, have influenced
the evolution of First Amendment jurisprudence. The significance
and importance of independent and private choice as a factor in a
First Amendment analysis of a government aid program depends
upon which of these two theories a court is inclined to find more
persuasive.
Although there are no definite labels for the two theories, they
may be described as the "no-aid" theory and the "non-discrimination"
theory.13 Proponents of the no-aid theory maintain that the First
Amendment prohibits "any government conduct that aids religion,"
and they are particularly concerned with financial aid to religious in-
stitutions.14 In other words, by remaining inactive with respect to re-
ligion, government will do nothing that will help or hurt religion and
will not violate the First Amendment. 15 Proponents of the non-dis-
crimination theory, on the other hand, maintain that government
may not engage in conduct that discriminates "either in favor of relig-
ion or against religion."16 Thus, the State must treat analogous secu-
lar activities in the same manner in order to avoid violating the First
Amendment.17
Depending on the context, time-period, or the facts of the case
before the Court, these two perspectives on the meaning of the First
12 See Nicole Stelle Garnett & Richard W. Garnett, School Choice, the First Amend-
ment, and Social Justice, 4 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 301, 314-15 (2000) (discussing the diffi-
culty of identifying a "grand unifying theory" for the First Amendment and that at
least two theories about the meaning of the First Amendment are the "no-aid" and
"non-discrimination" theories).
13 See Douglas Laycock, The Underlying Unity of Separation and Neutrality, 46 EMORY
L.J. 43, 48 (1997); see also Carl H. Esbeck, A Constitutional Case for Governmental Cooper-
ation with Faith-Based Social Service Providers, 46 EMORY L.J. 1, 3-4 (1997) (referring to
the no-aid theory as a "separationism" theory and the non-discrimination theory as a
"neutrality" theory); Marci Hamilton, Power, the Establishment Clause, and Vouchers, 31
CONN. L. REV. 807, 822 (1999) (describing the nondiscrimination theory as a "non-
preferentialist school"); Ira C. Lupu, The Lingering Death of Separationism, 62 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 230, 231-32 (1994) (describing the no-aid theory as a "separationism"
theory and the nondiscrimination theory as a "neutrality" theory); Eugene Volokh,
Equal Treatment Is Not Establishment, 13 NOTRE DAMEJ.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 341, 342
(1999) (referring to the no-aid theory as a "fio-money flow" theory and the non-dis-
crimination theory as an "equal treatment" theory).
14 See Laycock, supra note 13, at 48.
15 See id.
16 Id.
17 See id.
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Amendment have received varying degrees of significance when the
Court has evaluated government school aid programs. 18 In other
words, at times, the no-aid theory has been the prominent and deci-
sive analytical approach, while at other times, the non-discrimination
theory has been the prominent and decisive approach. It is important
to point out, however, that even in one of the early significant deci-
sions in this area, Everson v. Board of Education,19 both theories played
a role in the Court's decisionmaking. In Everson, the Court rejected a
strict no-aid approach to interpreting the First Amendment, although
neither theory has been universally rejected at any point. A strict no-
aid approach would prohibit any form of aid to a religious institution
under the First Amendment. Instead, in Everson the Court concluded
that general government services that were indisputably marked-off
from the religious functions of an institution were permissible under
the First Amendmefit. 20
Most important for purposes of this Note is that the significance
of independent and private choice as a factor in a First Amendment
analysis will vary depending on the degree to which either the no-aid
theory or the non-discrimination theory influences a court's decision.
For a court concerned that no aid from the government in any way
advance religion, the existence of an independent and private choice
will be less significant in justifying the program. Even when an indi-
vidual makes such a choice, a court may believe there will still be
forms of impermissible aid because, under a no-aid approach, the
goal is to avoid any government activity which somehow favors relig-
ion. On the other hand, for a court concerned with nondiscrimina-
tion, the existence of an independent and private choice will be very
significant, perhaps insulating a government program from First
18 See Esbeck, supra note 13, at 10-11 (summarizing distinctions that influenced
whether the Court would reject the no-aid approach when analyzing a government
aid program, such as whether the institution was "pervasively sectarian," whether the
aid was "indirect" or "direct," and whether the aid was "divertible" to sectarian uses);
see also Laycock, supra note 13, at 55 (discussing the distinctions described by Profes-
sor Esbeck).
19 330 U.S. 1 (1947). For a discussion of Everson, see infra text accompanying
notes 20-26.
20 See id. at 18. In Everson, there were two dissents. See id. at 18-28 (Jackson, J.,
dissenting); id. at 28-74 (Rutiedge, J., dissenting). Both dissents rejected a strict no-
aid approach to interpreting and applying the First Amendment. See id. at 25-26
(Jackson, J., dissenting) (agreeing that the First Amendment permitted the govern-
ment to provide police and fire protection to religious institutions); id. at 49-58 (Rut-
ledge,J., dissenting) (acknowledging that there are exclusively public services that aid
religion). Instead, both dissents disagreed with the majority's factual conclusions. See
id. at 19-20 (Jackson, J., dissenting); id. at 44-49 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
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Amendment attack. In this instance, because the goal is to avoid gov-
ernment discrimination in favor of religion, when an individual makes
an independent and private choice to direct aid towards religion, gov-
ernment is not responsible for the advancement of religion.
II. ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
The tension between the theories discussed in the previous sec-
tion, as indicated above, is important to understanding the develop-
ment of Establishment Clause doctrine. Part of that development, as
this Section will explore, is the development of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence as it applies to government aid programs. Most impor-
tant, this Section will describe the way "genuine and independent pri-
vate choices" became important under the First Amendment, and the
meaning the Court has given this phrase as it has evolved over the
course of a little more than fifty years.
A. General Applicability and Secular Content
The Court's initial decisions about the permissibility of aid to re-
ligious institutions under the First Amendment may be characterized
as primarily concerned with two principles: the general applicability of
government aid programs and the content of the aid these programs
distributed. These early decisions did not establish a definitive test for
analyzing government aid programs under the First Amendment.
The first influential decision to establish the importance of the above
principles under the First Amendment was Everson. In Everson, a
township board of education authorized reimbursements to parents
of money the parents spent for the bus transportation of their chil-
dren on buses operated by the public transportation system.2'
Justice Black, writing for the Court, concluded that the reim-
bursement program did not violate the First Amendment.22 The
Court agreed that the Fourteenth Amendment made the First Amend-
ment applicable to the states. 23 Black concluded that under the First
Amendment a state or the federal government must be neutral in its
relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers and that
21 See id. at 3.
22 See id. at 17-18.
23 See id. at 8. Interestingly, there was little discussion, and no dispute, about
whether the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment applied to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Michael A. Paulsen, Religion, Equality, and
the Constitution: An Equal Protection Approach to Establishment Clause Adjudication, 61
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 311, 318 (1986).
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the State may not use its power to handicap or favor religions.24 The
reimbursement program satisfied these conditions. First, the bus ser-
vice was a service like fire protection in that it was "so indisputably
marked off' from the religious functions of the schools that its con-
tent was secular.25 Second, the State was providing a general service
to all parents, regardless of their religions.26
About twenty years later, this understanding of the Establishment
Clause influenced the Court's decision in Board of Education v. Allen.27
In Allen, a New York state law required local public school authorities
to lend textbooks free of charge to all students in grades seven
through twelve, including students at private, sectarian schools. 28 The
Court concluded that the program was permissible under the First
Amendment because, under Everson, a state does not violate the Estab-
lishment Clause when it neutrally extends the benefits of state laws to
all citizens regardless of their religious affiliation. 29
The Court stated that when assessing the validity of legislation
under the Establishment Clause, it would consider whether the pur-
pose and primary effect of legislation was to advance or inhibit relig-
ion.30 The Court concluded that the purpose of the legislation was to
"further the educational opportunities available to the young," and
that there was nothing that demonstrated any effects different from
the stated purpose of the legislation.31 Demonstrating its concern for
the principles established in Everson, the Court considered both the
general applicability of the program and the content of the distrib-
uted books. According to the Court, the benefits of the program were
generally available because regardless of religion, any student who re-
quested the books could receive them.3 2 With regard to the books'
content, the Court acknowledged that books are different from buses,
but stated that the record gave it no reason to conclude that either the
sectarian schools had received anything other than secular books or
24 See Everson, 330 U.S. at 18.
25 Id. at 17-18.
26 Id. at 18.
27 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
28 See id. at 238.
29 See id. at 242, 248.
30 See id. at 243.
31 Id.
32 See id. at 243-44.
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that sectarian schools were using the books for religious instruction.33
Thus, the program was permissible under the First Amendment.3 4
B. The Lemon Test
In the early 1970s in Lemon v. Kurtzman,35 the Court relied on the
principles developed in cases like Everson and Allen to articulate the
now well-known "Lemon test." In Lemon, the Court considered two
similar programs, one in Pennsylvania and another in Rhode Island.
Essentially, the programs reimbursed nonpublic schools for some of
the costs they incurred for teachers' salaries, textbooks, and instruc-
tional materials in secular subjects.3 6 The Court held that both stat-
utes were unconstitutional.3 7
In reaching its conclusion, the Court reasoned that there are
three tests to consider: (1) whether a statute has a secular legislative
purpose; (2) whether a statute's principal or primary effect either ad-
vances or inhibits religion; and (3) whether a statute fosters excessive
government entanglement with religion.38 The Court concluded that
both statutes had appropriate secular legislative purposes.3 9 Instead
of considering the effects of each statute under the second test, how-
ever, the Court reasoned that because both statutes created excessive
33 See id. at 244-49. The board also contended that the program violated their
Free Exercise rights. See id. at 248. The Court rejected this claim because the board
failed to show the "coercive effect of the enactment as it operates against [it] in the
practice of [its] religion." Id. at 248-49. This suggests an interesting problem. As
discussed by Professor Paulsen, by appearing to acknowledge that there are two
"types" of claims, an "Establishment" claim and a "Free Exercise" claim, the opinion
may demonstrate an important misunderstanding of the First Amendment; that is,
they are the same claim. See Paulsen, supra note 23, at 325 ("[T]he establishment
clause is best understood as providing for the equal protection of the free exercise of
religion."); see also Mary Ann Glendon & Raul F. Yanes, Structural Free Exercise, 90
MICH. L. REV. 477, 492 (1991) ("A single coherent provision that on its face seemed to
protect freedom of religion by forbidding Congress to establish religion or otherwise
burden free exercise became two 'clauses' with free exercise regularly subordinated to
a broad notion of nonestablishment."). Such a claim should probably be stated some-
thing like: "the government is 'establishing' one religion (or 'religion') through this
program, thus infringing upon the board's right to freely exercise its religious
beliefs."
34 See Allen, 392 U.S. at 248.
35 403 U.S. 602 (1971). Although described as a "test," the Court may not have
thought it was establishing a bright-line test, but rather, gathering previously used
factors together. See Hamilton, supra note 13, at 809.
36 See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 606-07.
37 See id. at 607.
38 See id. at 612-13.
39 See id. at 613.
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entanglements between government and religion, consideration of
the second test was unnecessary.40
Shortly after Lemon, one of the first decisions to apply the Lemon
test was Committee for Public Education Religious Liberty v. Nyquist.4 1 In
Nyquist, the Court began to discuss the way in which individual choice
in the use of aid affects the permissibility of a government aid pro-
gram under the First Amendment. The State of New York had en-
acted a statute that provided (1) direct money grants to nonpublic
schools for maintenance and repair of school facilities, (2) tuition re-
imbursements to qualifying parents of children attending elementary
or secondary non-public schools, and (3) tax deductions to parents
who did not qualify for the reimbursement, limited to parents earning
below a set level of annual income. 42 The Court held that all three
forms of aid violated the Establishment Clause.43
In assessing the tuition reimbursement program, the Court con-
sidered the element of individual choice, but other factors were ulti-
mately more persuasive. According to the Court, that the State
disbursed the aid directly to parents was "only one among many fac-
tors to be considered."44 Even though the aid went directly to par-
ents, the reimbursements were different from the permissible forms
of aid in both Everson and Allen.45 The reimbursements differed from
the bus fare program in Everson because the bus fare program was aid
that the State "provided in common to all citizens" that could "fairly
be viewed as [a] reflection[ ] of a neutral posture toward religious
institutions. ' 46 The reimbursements in Nyquist, however, went prima-
rily to those who chose to attend religious institutions and, therefore,
were not generally available to all.47 The reimbursements were also
40 See id. at 613-14.
41 413 U.S. 756 (1973). Nyquist has been described as a "smart-bomb" because
opponents of voucher programs have often argued that undesired programs resemble
the programs in Nyquist, thus rendering the undesired program unconstitutional. See
Garnett & Garnett, supra note 12, at 320 & n.89. For an example of this, see Hamil-
ton, supra note 13, at 838 ("To be true to the Establishment Clause's fundamental
political presuppositions, the courts would do best to adopt the Court's'approach in
Nyquist."). But see McConnell, supra note 10, at 856 ("Th [e] reasoning [in Nyquist] is
obviously at odds with later decisions.").
42 Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 762-66 (citation omitted).
43 See id. at 798.
44 Id. at 781.
45 See id. at 782-83.
46 Id. at 782. This statement also applied to the other forms of aid mentioned in
Everson, such as police and fire protection, sewage disposals, highways, and sidewalks
for parochial schools. See id. at 781-82.
47 See id.
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different from the books provided in Allen because unlike the books,
the reimbursements were not subject to restrictions that would guar-
antee that state aid only supported secular educational functions.48
The Court rejected the argument that the aid was permissible because
there was no element of coercion attached to the reimbursements af-
ter parents had already paid tuition, stating that the absence of coer-
cion was "irrelevant to questions arising under the Establishment
Clause."
49
Last, the Court rejected an argument that the reimbursements
did not violate the First Amendment because they were designed to
promote the free exercise of religion.50 The Court recognized that
the State may not interfere with parents' rights to educate their chil-
dren in sectarian schools. 51 However, because the Establishment and
Free Exercise Clauses were inevitably in tension, "it may often not be
possible to promote the former without offending the latter."52 Be-
cause of this, the State must remain neutral, neither advancing nor
inhibiting religion. 53 The reimbursement program advanced religion
and was therefore impermissible, even though it provided opportuni-
ties for the poor to choose between public and nonpublic educa-
tion.5 4 Apparently, paying public school taxes at the same time
individuals support other schools is a burden they must bear so as not
to erode the limitations of the Establishment Clause.55
48 See id. at 782-83. During the discussion of Allen the Court included footnote
38, that indicated one of the problems with the program in Nyquist was that the class
of beneficiaries did not include all school children. This probably supports the posi-
tion that neutrally available aid is likely to be permissible under the First Amendment.
See id. at 782 n.38; McConnell, supra note 10, at 856.
49 Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 786. It is difficult to understand how the absence of coer-
cion could be "irrelevant" under the Establishment Clause when it seems clear that
the First Amendment was meant to prevent the government from forcing citizens to
adopt a particular position with respect to religion. See Volokh, supra note 13, at 367
("[T]he Court's Establishment Clause cases suggest that the government may no
more discriminate against religion than discriminate in its favor."). For the govern-
ment to be "establishing" religion it necessarily must be coercing individuals into ac-
cepting a particular position with regards to religion. Cf id. at 371-72 ("[The
Establishment Clause's] core meaning is no special benefit for religion-'establish-
ing' something must necessarily mean treating it better than its rivals.").
50 See Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 788.
51 See id.
52 Id. Again, this may reflect an important misunderstanding of the First Amend-
ment. See Paulsen, supra note 23, at 324-25; see also supra note 33 and accompanying
text.
53 See Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 788.
54 See id.
55 See id. at 788-89.
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C. The Emergence of "Independent and Private Choice" as a
Signiflcant Factor
Changing course from decisions like Lemon and Nyquist, the last
twenty years have witnessed the Court produce four decisions, Mueller
v. Allen,5 6 Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind,57
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District,5 8 and Agostini v. Felton,59
among others, that have brought considering whether genuine and
independent private choices existed under government aid programs
to the forefront of constitutional analyses. 60 These decisions began to
define this phrase for purposes of First Amendment analyses, making
them an important foundation for the decision in Mitchell.
1. Mueller v. Allen
In Mueller, the State of Minnesota permitted taxpayers to deduct
actual expenses incurred for the "tuition, textbooks, and transporta-
tion" of dependents who attended elementary or secondary schools. 61
The Court held that the deductions did not violate the Establishment
Clause. 62 The Court analyzed the program under the Lemon test and
concluded that the deductions had an acceptable secular purpose be-
cause they were. meant to defray the cost of parents' educational ex-
penses, regardless of the schools their children attended. 63 The Court
56 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
57 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
58 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
59 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
60 See Garnett & Garnett, supra note 12, at 321-24; Hamilton, supr& note 13, at
831. Other decisions considered relevant to and responsible for this change include:
Rosenberger v. Rector & Vrisitors of the University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 845-46 (1995)
(holding that it does not violate the Establishment Clause when the University of
Virginia authorizes payments for printing a student-run religious newspaper when the
same payments are available to other student-run papers); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S.
589, 618 (1988) (holding consitutional under the Establisment Clause a federal grant
program that provided neutrally available funding for services related to adolescent
sexuality and pregnancy); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981) (holding that
the Establishment Clause does not prohibit a policy of granting religious groups equal
access to university facilities generally available to other student groups); and Wolman
v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 255 (1977) (holding constitutional under the Establishment
Clause an Ohio statute which authorized the state to provide educational materials
and services to nonpublic and mostly sectarian schools).
61 Mueller, 463 U.S. at 391.
62 See id. at 404.
63 See id. at 394-96. Even before analyzing the program under the Lemon test, the
Court asserted that it has consistently rejected the notion that "any program which in
some manner aids an institution with a religious affiliation violates the Establishment
Clause." Id. at 393 (citations omitted). This is similar to the argument advanced by
2001]
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also concluded that the deductions did not have the primary effect of
advancing sectarian aims of religious institutions, thus satisfying the
second part of the Lemon test.6 4 According to the Court, a number of
reasons supported the decision. Of those reasons, it was important
that "numerous private choices of individual parents" determined
how, and how much, financial assistance arrived at religious institu-
tions.65 The opinion did not discuss what it meant for a choice to be
independent and private.
2. Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind
Much like Mueller, in Witters the Court continued to elevate the
level of importance it accorded the existence of private individual
choices under the First Amendment's Religion Clauses. In Witters, a
Washington statute authorized the Washington Commission for the
Blind to provide aid for professional training or education to visually
handicapped individuals. 66 The Supreme Court concluded that it
would not advance religion in a manner inconsistent with the First
Amendment if the Commission financed an applicant's studies at a
Christian college under the Washington statutory program.67
Under the Lemon test, the Court concluded that the program did
not have the principal or primary effect of impermissibly advancing
religion.68 The Court reasoned that previous decisions required it to
analyze whether extension of aid to the applicant was like the aid in
Lemon and Nyquist and thus impermissible, or like the aid a religious
institution would receive if a state paid its employees when the state
knew they would donate all or part of their salary to a religious institu-
tion and thus permissible.69 According to the Court, through Wash-
ington's program the State provided assistance directly to students,
who then chose which institution would receive the assistance. 70
Professor Volokh, discussed above. See Volokh, supra note 13, at 371-72; see also supra
note 49 and accompanying text.
64 See Mueller, 463 U.S. at 396.
65 See id. at 399.
66 Witters v. Wash. Dept. of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 483 (1986).
67 See id. at 489.
68 See id. at 486. The first and third prongs of the Lemon analysis received little
discussion in the opinion. Under the first prong, whether a statute had a legislative
purpose, there was no dispute. See id. at 485-86. As for the third prong, the Court
declined to consider whether the program excessively entangled the government and
religion, stating that it would be inappropriate for the Court to address this issue with
an incomplete record. See id. at 489 n.5.
69 See id. at 487.
70 See id.
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Therefore, any aid a religious institution received under the program
reached the institution only as result of "genuinely independent and
private choices of aid recipients," which supported the conclusion that
the program was permissible under the First Amendment.71 The
choices were genuinely independent and private because benefits
were available regardless of the nature of the institution benefited;
thus, the program did not create any financial incentives to undertake
sectarian education by providing greater or broader benefits for those
who chose to apply their aid to religious education. 72
3. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District
Following its opinions in Mueller and Witters, in Zobrest the Court
continued to treat independent choice as a significant factor. In
Zobrest, a deaf student and his parents requested a sign-language inter-
preter for the student's classes at a Roman Catholic high school under
the Individuals with Disabilities Act73 (IDEA).74 The Court held that
the school district could provide the student with an interpreter on
school premises without violating the First Amendment.75 As a gen-
eral principle, the Court stated that the government does not violate
the Establishment Clause when it operates programs that "neutrally
provide benefits to a broad class of citizens defined without reference
to religion."76 The Court explained that when assessing a program's
neutrality, Mueller and Witters established that two important factors
under the First Amendment are whether the aid is available to all
members of class defined without reference to religion and whether
aid ultimately reaches religious institutions because of individuals' in-
dependent and private choices. 77 Relying on Mueller and Witters, the
Court stated that choices are independent and private when the gov-
ernment does not create a financial incentive to "undertake sectarian
education."78
71 See id.
72 See id. at 487-88.
73 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1491 (1994).
74 See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 3 (1993).
75 See id. at 13-14.
76 See id. at 8. The Court argued that religious institutions must be able to receive
general government benefits because otherwise there would be "absurd results," like
the government being unable to provide things like police and fire protection. See id.
77 See id. at 9.
78 Id. at 10. The Court stated that when these two factors are satisfied a program
does not "advance religion in a manner inconsistent with the Establishment Clause."
Id This is important because it reflects an understanding of the First Amendment
under which "advancement," in and of itself, is not prohibited. SeeVolokh, supra note
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The Court concluded that providing the interpreter would not
run afoul of these factors.79 As part of a general program, any "handi-
capped" child could receive an interpreter, regardless of whether the
school a child attended was sectarian.80 Parents, thus, were free to
choose the school their children would attend because there was no
financial incentive to choose one school over another-their children
could receive an interpreter no matter where they chose to send
them.8' Therefore, interpreters were only on sectarian school prem-
ises due to the private and independent decisions of parents, and
their presence there would not violate the First Amendment.82
4. Agostini v. Felton
After the development of independent and private choice, laid
out in Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest, in Agostini the Court revisited its
decision in Aguilar v. Felton,83 when it had held that the City of New
York could not send public school teachers into parochial schools to
provide remedial education to disadvantaged children under a con-
gressionally mandated program.8 4 The Court concluded that Aguilar
was inconsistent with subsequent decisions under the First
Amendment.85
The Court reasoned that Aguilar, and its companion case School
District v. Ball,86 had rested on assumptions that subsequent decisions
had undermined.8 7 One of these assumptions was that "any and all
public aid that directly aids the educational function of. religious
schools impermissibly finances religious indoctrination, even if the aid
reaches such schools as a consequence of private decisionmaking."88
13, at 371-72 ("'[E]stablishing' something must necessarily mean treating it better
than its rivals.").
79 See Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 10.
80 See id.
81 See id.
82 See id.
83 473 U.S. 402, 414 (1985) (holding the City of New York's remedial education
program unconstitutional under the Establisment Clause).
84 SeeAgostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 208 (1997). On remand from the decision
in Aguilar, a district court in New York entered a permanent injunction that prohib-
ited public school teachers from providing services in parochial schools. See id.
85 See id. at 209.
86 473 U.S. 373, 397-98 (1985) (holding unconstitutional under the Establisment
Clause two Michigan programs which financed classes in nonpublic and mostly secta-
rian schools which were taught by teachers who had been hired by the public school
system).
87 See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 222 (citations omitted).
88 Id.
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Relying on Witters and Zobrest, the Court concluded that when an indi-
vidual chooses to direct government aid to a religious institution, even
direct aid may be permissible.8 9 Consistent with previous decisions,
the Court stated that impermissible incentives are not present when
there are no financial incentives to choose a sectarian school due to
neutral and secular allocation criteria that neither favor nor disfavor
religion and that make aid "available to both religious and secular
beneficiaries on a nondiscriminatory basis."90
III. THE SIGNIFICANCE AND MEANING OF "INDEPENDENT AND PRIVATE
CHOICE" IN MITCHELL V. HELMS
Moving forward from Agostini, in Mitchell v. Helms,9 1 the Court
returned to the principle of independent and private choice. It held
that a local governmental unit could provide materials and equipment
to religiously affiliated private schools under Chapter 2 of the Educa-
tion Consolidation and Improvement Act9 2 without violating the Es-
tablishment Clause of the First Amendment.93 Justice Thomas,
writing for three other members of the Court, began by explaining
the way in which Agostini had revised the criteria by which the Court
would analyze a statute's effect. Under Agostini and the cases upon
which it relied, the Court will consider three primary criteria: (1)
whether the statute results in governmental indoctrination; (2)
whether the statute defines its recipients by reference to religion; and
(3) whether the statute creates an excessive entanglement.9 4
89 See id. at 225-26.
90 Id. at 231. Also important from Agostiniis that the Court "modified" the Lemon
test. The Court concluded that because analyzing whether a program excessively en-
tangled government and religion entailed considering the same factors as analyzing a
program's "effect," the excessive entanglement inquiry should now be treated as an
aspect of the "effects" analysis. See id. at 233.
91 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
92 20 U.S.C. §§ 7301-7373 (1994). Chapter 2 provides aid "for the acquisition
and use of instructional and educational materials, including library services and
materials (including media materials), assessments, reference materials, computer
softvare and hardware for instructional use, and other curricular materials." Id.
§ 7351 (b) (2).
93 See Mitchel 530 U.S. at 801 (plurality opinion). The materials and equipment
were, among other items, library books, computers, computer software, slide and
movie projectors, overhead projectors, television sets, tape recorders, VCRs, projec-
tion screens, laboratory equipment, maps, globes, filmstrips, slides, and cassette re-
cordings. Id. at 803 (plurality opinion).
94 See id. at 808 (plurality opinion). Because there was no challenge as to the
statute's purpose, the Court only addressed Chapter 2's effect. See id. at 808 (plurality
opinion).
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According to Justice Thomas, when aid is offered to a broad
range of groups or individuals, without regard to their religion, no
one will reasonably conclude that the government is participating in
religious indoctrination, thus making it possible to conclude that the
aid is neutral.95 In considering whether the government is neutrally
providing aid, it is significant that the aid reaches religious institutions
through the genuine and independent private choices of
individuals. 96
The Court concluded that the program did not have the effect of
advancing religion. 97 First, the government was neutrally distributing
the aid because the statute required distribution to be on a per capita
basis, with the amount allocated to private schools equaling the
amount allocated to public schools. 98 Second, the statute did not re-
sult in government indoctrination because the aid was available to a
broad array of schools without regard to their religious affiliations, it
reached the schools only due to private decisionmaking, and it did
not have impermissible content.99
Justice Thomas relied on Mueller, Witters, Zobrest, and Agostini to
conclude that individual choices are not independent when financial
incentives to undertake religious education exist. 100 In Mitchell, such
financial incentives did not exist because the aid was distributed
through a per capita allocation system, thus creating no financial in-
centive for parents to choose one school over another because the aid
would "follow" their children. 10 1 Of consequence to the plurality,
therefore, was that parents had made an independent and private de-
cision to send their children to a particular school not, however,
where the parents directed this particular aid. In addition to financial
incentives, in general, there may not be other incentives for individu-
als to choose religious education for an aid program to remain consti-
tutionally permissible. 10 2 The plurality opinion did not discuss the
existence of any other impermissible incentives in Mitchell.
The opinion made two other important points related to the is-
sue of independent and private choice. First, based on Allen, Everson,
and Mueller, Justice Thomas concluded that an impermissible "incen-
tive" for parents to choose a religious education does not exist when
95 See id. at 809-10 (plurality opinion).
96 See id. at 810 (plurality opinion).
97 See id. at 829 (plurality opinion).
98 See id. (plurality opinion).
99 See id. at 830 (plurality opinion).
100 See id. at 813-14 (plurality opinion).
101 See id. at 830 (plurality opinion).
102 See id. at 813-14 (plurality opinion).
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religious schools receive a benefit that reduces the cost of securing a
religious education. 03 Second, for an independent and private
choice to exist, the aid does not literally need to pass through the
hands of the parents or children. 10 4 When aid does, it merely makes it
easier to see the independent and private choice.
105
Justice O'Connor wrote separately, concurring in the judgment
with Justice Breyer. I0 6 According to the concurrence, however, the
plurality opinion assigned almost singular importance to the "neutral-
ity" factor for future Establishment Clause adjudication. 0 7 The con-
currence contended that in Zobrest and Agostini the Court considered
other factors in previous decisions, making neutrality alone insuffi-
cient to qualify aid as permissible under the First Amendment.
08
According to the concurrence, and important for purposes of
this Note, it was significant that the aid in these two cases went directly
to the students or their parents, who then decided to which purpose
they would direct the aid.109 Justice O'Connor disagreed with Justice
Thomas, contending that a true private choice program only exists
when a student may attend a religious school and still retain control
over whether secular government aid will be applied toward religious
education. 10 Based on this difference, the concurring opinion would
treat per capita aid programs differently from "true" private choice
103 See id. at 814 (plurality opinion).
104 See id. at 815-17 (plurality opinion). As will be discussed, this in an important
point, one with which the concurring Justices had a different view. See infra text ac-
companying notes 111-13, 118-19.
105 See Mitchell 530 U.S. at 816 (plurality opinion). Justice Thomas rejected two
additional arguments as inconsistent with recent case law. First, he concluded that it
can be permissible for the government to provide direct, nonincidental aid to the
primary educational missions of religious schools under Mueller, Witters, and Agostini.
See id. at 814-15 (plurality opinion). Second, he rejected an argument that divertible
aid should be prohibited, concluding that aid must merely be suitable for use in a
public school based on its content. See id. at 820-21 (plurality opinion).
106 See id. at 836 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
107 See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
108 See id. at 847-49 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The concurrence argued that
whether there was evidence of inculcation by publicly funded teachers, requirements
that aid be supplemental existed, and public funds ever reached the "coffers" of relig-
ious schools were all important factors. See id. at 847-48 (O'Connor, J., concurring);
see also Laura S. Underkuffler, Vouchers and Beyond: The Individual as Causative Agent in
Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 75 IND. L.J. 167, 187-90 (2000) (arguing that indi-
vidual choice alone is not enough to prevent an Establishment Clause violation when
the state gives direct financial support to religious institutions).
109 See Mitchell 530 U.S. at 846 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
110 See id. at 842-44 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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programs."1 ' ForJustices O'Connor and Breyer the difference was im-
portant because when the student retains control over where to direct
the aid, the choice being made is more visible and less likely to cause a
reasonable observer to perceive an aid program as government sup-
port for the advancement of religion.'1 2 Therefore, the concurring
opinion does not directly address the existence of impermissible in-
centives created by an aid program; rather, it addresses the visibility of
the choice to direct particular aid.
Justice Souter dissented, an opinion in which both Justices Ste-
vens and Ginsburg joined.' 13 According to the dissent, a majority of
the Court gave too much weight, if not inappropriately exclusive
weight, to whether a government aid program evenhandedly distrib-
uted aid that individuals ultimately directed to religious institutions
through independent and private choices."14 Instead, the dissent ar-
gued that the Court should also have considered other issues. 1 5 The
Court needed to evaluate the directness or indirectness of the distri-
bution, which includes whether individuals made independent and
private decisions.' 1 6
Like the concurrence, the dissent was concerned with the way the
per capita distribution affected the existence of an independent and
private choice.117 The dissent would also distinguish a per capita aid
program from other types of aid programs, because per capita aid pro-
grams do not give particular recipients the "right and genuine oppor-
tunity" to direct particular aid where they choose, including away
from religious organizations of which they are members." 8 There-
111 See id. at 842 (O'Connor, J. concurring).
112 Justice O'Connor is responsible for articulating what has been called the "en-
dorsement test," which generally asks whether a government aid program creates a
symbolic link between the government and religion. See Underkuffler, supra note
108, at 172 & n.26. For a useful description and critique of the test, see Steven D.
Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and the "No
Endorsement" Test, 86 MICH. L. REv. 266 (1987).
113 See Mitchell 530 U.S. at 867 (Souter, J., dissenting).
114 See id. at 900 (Souter, J., dissenting).
115 In addition to its concern with the issues related to independent and private
choice, the dissent also argued that the Court should have considered the nature of
the institutions to which the aid was directed and the characteristics of the aid itself.
See id. at 885 (Souter, J., dissenting). According to Justice Thomas, consideration of
whether an institution is pervasively sectarian is a factor the Court has properly given
considerably less relevance to in its recent decisions. See id. at 828-29 (plurality
opinion).
116 See id. at 885 (Souter, J., dissenting).
117 See id. at 902 (Souter, J., dissenting).
118 See id. (Souter, J., dissenting). In support of the dissent's argument, it points
out that "at least one" of those objecting to the program did so because she wanted to
[VOL. 77:1
IF A PUBLIC SCHOOL IS LABELED "FAILING"
fore, similar to the concurrence, the dissent would require an inde-
pendent choice with respect to specific instances of aid.
In summary, and in light of the concurrence in Mitchell, under
the First Amendment a school voucher program will probably be per-
missible if it satisfies the following conditions. First, the program must
have a secular purpose. Second, a program may not have the effect of
advancing or inhibiting religion. A program has an impermissible ef-
fect if it (1) results in governmental indoctrination, (2) defines its re-
cipients by reference to religion, or (3) creates an excessive
entanglement between the government and religious institutions.
At a minimum, the results under an effects analysis will depend
on whether religious indoctrination may reasonably be attributed to
government action. This attribution may not occur when aid is availa-
ble to a broad range of groups or individuals. Also, attribution may
not occur if aid reaches religious institutions through genuine and
independent private choices of individuals. Based on the concurring
opinion, other factors that may be relevant are whether the aid is
divertible to religious uses, whether there is actual evidence of inculca-
tion by publicly funded teachers, whether requirements that aid be
supplemental exist, and whether public funds ever reach religious
institutions.
Individuals make independent and private choices when govern-
ment programs do not create incentives to undertake sectarian educa-
tion, particularly financial incentives. Generally, such incentives do
not exist when the same aid is available regardless of whether an indi-
vidual chooses sectarian or non-sectarian education. The next Sec-
tion discusses two recent cases that differ over what it means for
government programs to create incentives to undertake religious
education.
IV. THE MEANING OF "GENUINELY INDEPENDENT AND PRIVATE
CHOICES" IN JACKsON V. BENSON AND SIMMoNs-
HARRIS V. ZELMAN
To explore what is means to have a true private choice within the
meaning developed by Mitchell and the decisions leading up to it, this
Section will discuss two relatively recent decisions, Jackson v. Benson 19
and Simmons-Harris v. Zelman,120 because of the similarities between
the programs involved and the courts' positions regarding the mean-
have the opportunity to choose not to have her religious school receive aid under the
program. See id. at 902 n.20 (Souter, J., dissenting).
119 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis. 1998).
120 234 F.Sd 945 (6th Cir. 2000).
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ing of "independent and private choice." In Jackson, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of the Milwaukee Pa-
rental Choice Program (MPCP). Under the MPCP, eligible students
could attend, at no cost to the students, any private school located in
the City of Milwaukee. 12' To be eligible for the program, students
had to be (1) students in kindergarten through twelfth grade, (2)
from a family with an income not in excess of 1.75 times the federal
poverty level, and (3) either enrolled in a public school in Milwaukee,
attending a private school under the program, or not enrolled in
school during the previous year. 122
The schools participating in the program also had to meet a num-
ber of requirements. Participating schools had to comply with federal
anti-discrimination provisions and all Wisconsin health and safety laws
applicable to Wisconsin public schools.123 Under amendments to the
MPCP, however, participating schools did not need to be "nonsec-
tarian." 124 Participating schools did, however, have to permit a stu-
dent to "opt-out" of any religious activity if the student's parent or
guardian submitted a written request for such an exemption. 125 Also,
due to an amendment, there was no restriction on the number of par-
ticipating students who could be enrolled in a particular private
school.126
The State did not pay participating schools directly. 27 Rather,
the State paid aid to each participating student's parent or guardian,
sending a check in the name of the parent or guardian to be restric-
tively endorsed at the chosen school. 128 The amount the State would
pay to a private school was also limited. The State would pay the lesser
of the amount equal to the state aid per student to which Milwaukee
Public Schools were entitled or the per pupil amount of "the private
school's 'operating and debt service cost.., that [was] related to edu-
cational programming."'1 29 The private schools were not subject to
any restrictions on the uses to which they may put funding acquired
through the MPCP. l3 0
121 Jackson, 578 N.W.2d. at 607.
122 Id. at 608.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 609.
126 Id. At the time the Wisconsin district court had issued an injunction, 3400
students were participating in the program. Id at 609 n.3.
127 See id.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 612. In the 1994-1995 term, the amount of aid to which a student would
have been entitled under state aid distribution formulas was $2500. Id. at 608.
130 Id.
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The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the program did not vio-
late the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.1 1 The pro-
gram satisfied the first prong of the Lemon test because the secular
purpose of the MPCP was to "provide low-income parents with an op-
portunity to have their children educated outside of the embattled
Milwaukee Public School system."1 32
Under the "effects" prong, the MPCP also passed muster. Al-
though making its decision before Mitchell, the court reviewed the de-
cisions leading up to it and concluded that a program satisfies this
part of the Lemon inquiry when the program: (1) neutrally offers assis-
tance based on "secular criteria that neither favor nor disfavor relig-
ion; and (2) does so only as a result of numerous private choices of
the individual parents of school-age children.' 33
Applying these principles to the MPCP, the court first concluded
that the eligibility requirements were neutral, secular criteria, made
available to all beneficiaries on a nondiscriminatory basis.134 Support-
ing this conclusion were the facts that neither were pupils selected on
the basis of religion nor were participating private schools, which
could be sectarian or non-sectarian. 135 Also supporting the neutrality
of the program was that the amount of money available to students
did not depend on the school that they attended. 3 6
The program passed the "effects" test also because the aid flowed
to religious schools only due to numerous private choices of the stu-
dents' parents or guardians.' 3 7 According to the court, parents had a
number of options for their children: "a neighborhood public school,
a different public school within the district, a specialized public
school, a private nonsectarian school, or a private sectarian school.' 38
Also supporting this conclusion was that the checks were made paya-
ble to the parents, were sent to the schools based on the parents'
choices, and could only cashed to cover the cost of tuition.'3 9 Most
131 See id. at 620. But see Underkuffler, supra note 108, at 180-81 (arguing that the
MPCP should have been held unconstitutional because it provided a significant
amount of non-incidental direct aid).
132 Id. at 612.
133 Id. at 617.
134 Id. The court rejected an argument that Nyquist controlled its decision, con-
cluding that the MPCP was different from the program in Nyquist because amend-
ments to the MPCP "merely added religious schools to a range of pre-existing
educational choices." Id. at 614 n.9.
135 See id. at 617.
136 See id.
137 See id. at 618.
138 Id. at 617-18.
139 See id. at 618.
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important, it seems, was that the State would not send checks to a
private school, sectarian or not, without a parent or guardian having
decided to have their child attend the private school. 140
Last, the MPCP did not involve an excessive entanglement be-
tween government and religion. 141 The State was not required to con-
tinuously monitor participating sectarian private schools. 142 Although
these schools were subject to reporting requirements, and nondis-
crimination, health, and safety obligations, enforcing these standards
was part of the oversight the state superintendent already conducted
as part of existing duties.'143 Therefore, excessive entanglement did
not result.
Based on the above conclusions of the Wisconsin Supreme Court,
the court probably would agree that a program offering only a failing
public school and sectarian schools as options provides a basis for an
independent and private decision under the First Amendment. First,
the court concluded that it was a permissible legislative purpose to
give parents the opportunity to take their children out of the "embat-
tled" public schools. 144 Next, the court still considered public schools
an option for parents, apparently even if they were failing public
schools. 145 When the court listed the options available to parents, it
did not qualify its list by stating that public schools are only an option
when they are not deemed failing or some other similar qualifica-
tion.146 Therefore, the court probably would still consider the public
schools an option and, thus, a genuine and independent private
choice to exist, even if the only schools to which parents could send
their children with vouchers were sectarian schools.
The voucher program in Simmons-Harris was similar in many ways
to the program in Jackson and was set up as follows. The program was
a legislative response to an order from the United States District Court
placing the Cleveland School District under "direct management and
supervision of the State Superintendent of Public Instruction."' 47 The
court issued the order based on mismanagement by the local school
board. 148
140 See id. at 618-19.
141 See id. at 619.
142 See id.
143 See id.
144 See id. at 612.
145 See id. at 617-18.
146 Id.
147 Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 F.3d 945, 948 (6th Cir. 2000).
148 Id.
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The program covered the Cleveland School District, providing
scholarships to children residing in that district attending kindergar-
ten through eighth grade.149 Students from low-income families re-
ceived preference for scholarships from the program. 150 Only after
the State had considered all students from low-income families for
scholarships could it provide scholarships to students who were not
from low-income families.151
The amount of the scholarship the program paid depended on
family income. Tuition at participating schools could not exceed
$2500 per year, and the program would pay ninety percent of tuition
for low-income families and seventy-five percent of tuition for students
from other families, up to a maximum of $1875 per year.15 2 The
scholarships were payable to the students' parents, and the program
mailed the scholarship checks to the schools chosen by the parents, to
be endorsed by the parents at these schools. 155
To be a program participant, a school had to register with the
voucher program. 154 Participant schools had to meet the State's edu-
cational standards.'5 5 Both public and private schools in districts adja-
cent to the Cleveland district were permitted to register, but none of
the public schools chose to register.' 56 Participating schools could
not discriminate on the basis of race, religion, or ethnic background,
nor could the schools "advocate or foster unlawful behavior, or teach
hatred of any person or group on the basis of race, ethnicity, national
origin, or religion." 57 The schools, however, were not subject to any
restrictions on the use of funds available to them through the
program.' 58
The Sixth Circuit found that this program violated the First
Amendment. According to the Sixth Circuit, Agostini had reaffirmed
the importance of the Lemon test, and because it had not been explic-
itly overruled, Nyquist was the most persuasive decision to follow
Lemon.'5 9 First, the court contended that other options available to
149 Id.
150 Id. "Low-income" was defined as a family whose income was less than two hun-
dred percent of the poverty line. Id. Children from families with incomes at or below
the poverty line represented over sixty percent of the scholarship recipients. Id.
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 See id. at 948.
154 Id.
155 See id.
156 Id. at 949.
157 Id. at 948-49.
158 Id. at 949.
159 See id. at 953.
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Cleveland parents like community schools were, at most, "irrele-
vant."1 60 The court explained that the program was factually similar
to Nyquist because parents directly received government funds and the
great majority of schools that received the funds were sectarian.161
Also similar to Nyquist was that the program created an excessive en-
tanglement between the government and religion. 162 Last, the pro-
gram was similar to the one in Nyquist because there were no
restrictions on the use of the funds. 163
In rejecting the program, the Sixth Circuit concluded that there
was "no evidence that the tuition vouchers [were] a neutral form" of
state aid. 164 The vouchers were not neutral aid because the program
offered an "illusory choice."'165 According to the court, the program
discouraged participation by schools that did not receive religious
funds because the amount of the voucher resulted in a financial disin-
centive for both adjacent public schools outside the Cleveland School
District and private non-sectarian schools within the district to register
for the program. 166 Because of this design, a majority of the partici-
pating schools, over eighty percent, were sectarian, and the program,
therefore, did not provide any "meaningful public school choice." 167
Therefore, the Sixth Circuit concluded that even though the legisla-
ture found it appropriate to provide parents with alternatives to a fail-
ing public school, the public school could not count as an option
when evaluating whether an independent and private choice exists. 168
In so doing, it ignored the ability of students to continue to attend
existing public schools.
160 Id. at 958. Similar to the problem discussed above with regards to Nyquist, it is
difficult to understand how available choices are irrelevant, when it seems that the
Establishment Clause protects individuals' right to choose how to relate themselves to
religion in all contexts, including education. See supra note 49 and accompanying
text. Whether the program creates impermissible incentives to choose program
schools over non-program schools thus seems to be a relevant inquiry for a court to
make and it seems to require consideration of other options.
161 See Simmons-Harris, 234 F.3d at 958.
162 See id. at 958-59.
163 See id. at 959.
164 Id.
165 See id.
166 See id.
167 See id. at 959-60.
168 See id. at 960-61.
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V. SHOULD A "FAILiNG" PUBLIC SCHOOL BE CONSIDERED AN OPTION
WHEN EVALUATING WHETHER AN INDEPENDENT AND
PRIVATE CHOIcE EXISTS?
The different positions adopted by the Wisconsin Supreme Court
and the Sixth Circuit give rise to the questions posed in the heading:
Should a "failing" public school be considered an option when evalu-
ating whether an independent and private choice exists? To work to-
wards an answer to this question, it will initially be useful to discuss
what it means for a school to be "failing." In the context of education,
we may use this term to describe related, but different situations. In
one sense, a school may "fail" for an individual student, and yet, still
be performing at a level which adequately serves the vast majority of
students, such that no one would say, "that school is failing." In other
words, we probably mean that we do not think there are general
problems with the school with which we should be concerned.
Rather, for whatever reason, the school does not meet the needs of an
individual student. In some instances, this may be because the stu-
dent has some type of recognized disability with which a school is not
equipped to deal. In other instances, parents or children have de-
cided that a given school is not meeting their needs for other reasons
that are too specific to the individual children to lead to a general
conclusion that there are problems with the way. in which a school is
functioning.
When we say, instead, that "a school is failing" (or "embattled") we
probably mean that it is no longer performing at an adequate level,
such that more than a typical number of students are not receiving
the kind of education we would expect them to receive. For example,
its average test scores are well below the national average. When this
happens, it too describes different situations. In some situations, it
may be that the school is performing so poorly that we would expect
the government to shut the school down. In other instances, however,
the government keeps the school open, like in both Milwaukee and
Cleveland. Presumably, this is because the school is performing at a
level where it still functions for enough of its students such that we
could not conclude that the state is depriving the students who attend
the school of an education.
These distinctions regarding different instances when schools are
"failing" may offer insight into our conclusions regarding the ques-
tion, somewhat modified, posed in the Introduction: Does a "failing"
school, which the government has decided to leave open, present an
option such that a decision to attend another school may appropri-
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ately be described as a "true independent and private choice"? I pro-
pose that it does, based on the following discussion and examples.
Children or parents may decide that a particular school does not
meet a child's needs for reasons independent of some recognized dis-
ability. For instance, they might think another public school is better
than the one in their district. If the government refused to permit the
child to attend the other public school, and the only other options in
the child's school district were sectarian schools, we probably would
not conclude that a decision to attend a sectarian school was not inde-
pendent and private. This is because it is probably generally accepted
that children do not have the right to attend any public school they
wish, even if they conclude that other schools would perform better
for them than the one that they are currently attending. 16 9 This
would also be true even if they were able to point to some kind of
statistical data that shows, in some objective sense, that another public
school might be better than the one they are currently attending. In
this situation, the government cannot fairly be said to be coercing
someone into adopting a particular position with respect to religion
just because they do not permit them to attend the public school of
their choice, and the only other private options are sectarian. We
probably would conclude that this is not the kind of improper incen-
tive with which the Court has been, or should be, concerned.
I propose that when a government leaves a so-called failing
school open, it is incorrect to conclude that it makes a situation so
different from the situation described in the above paragraph that it
results in incentives to undertake sectarian education. In this situa-
tion, the government has recognized that there is a problem with the
way a school is functioning and determines that it meets the criteria
for "failing." Presumably, however, that it left the school open means
it decided that the school can still educate a number of students, just
not the number it typically expects from its schools. One possible re-
sult of such a determination is the concern that this government rec-
ognition causes parents to have for their children's education, and,
based on this concern, will choose to take their children out of the
"failing" school. This possibility, however, exists regardless of whether
there is a government voucher program through which funds may
reach religious institutions.
For instance, a government recognizes a school in a district as
"failing" and because of this, decides to devote more funds than it
provides the rest of the similarly situated schools in the state in order
169 Absent some disability or other generally recognized compelling interest of the
child.
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to have the school achieve at more acceptable levels. If the only avail-
able alternatives in such a district were sectarian schools, we probably
would not conclude that the government had created an incentive to
undertake sectarian education based only on it having labeled the
school as "failing." The decisions parents made to take their children
out of the school would still be independent and private.
Likewise, if in the very same district the government labeled the
school as "failing," devoted more funds to the school, and established
a voucher program, the government has not in any meaningful way
created an incentive to undertake sectarian education. Rather, the
government has provided another option without making the situa-
tion any more coercive. A decision to leave the school in this situation
is no less independent and private; it is just that aid is now directed to
a religious institution. Parents still have to evaluate the school for
their child's needs the same as they would if there were no voucher
program; it is just that parents now have more choices, not more gov-
ernment incentives to leave. It is fundamentally inconsistent to argue
that giving parents an option where they had none before is somehow
not a free or real choice.
In addition, it is important to distinguish whether a choice was
independent and private from other concerns related to the use of
government-provided aid in, or in furtherance of, religion or religious
institutions. As discussed above, the concurring justices in Mitchell
were concemed with the "visibility" of the choice. 170 This concern, no
matter how relevant it may be to a constitutional analysis, should not
be relevant to determining whether a choice was independent or pri-
vate. Whether other people perceive the use of aid once held by the
government to be an "endorsement" of religion, once we have con-
cluded an independent and private choice by a particular individual
has been made is different from being concerned with whether an
independent and private choice existed.
Another concern that is different from the concern with the inde-
pendence or privacy of a choice is the concern with the effect of the
choice. If the proper way to interpret the First Amendment is that it is
meant to prevent "direct" aid or more than "incidental" aid, it may be
that even some choices which are independent and private are not the
proper type of choice for purposes of making some forms of aid per-
missible under the First Amendment. In this instance again, however,
it is not the independence or privacy of the choice with which we are
concerned. Rather, it is that some kind of impermissible government
advancement exists. It is worth pointing out, however, that it is diffi-
170 See supra text accompanying notes 110-12, 117-18.
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cult to conceive of how, once we have concluded that an independent
and private choice exists, we could still conclude that it is still some-
how government advancement of religion, solely based on the fact that
the government once possessed the aid. Such a conclusion would
likely make impermissible other forms of aid now considered
permissible.
We should not conclude-and nor should a court conclude as
the Sixth Circuit did-that a public school is not a "real" option for
purposes of the First Amendment because it has been labeled "fail-
ing," "embattled," or "troubled." To do so is to challenge, and essen-
tially overrule, a legislative determination that such a school is a viable
option to which it should continue to provide money and resources.
Without a challenge to the legislature's decision, or other clear evi-
dence of legislative error, a court should not independently eliminate
one of the choices under a government aid program because it ap-
pears undesirable to the court. 171 Ultimately, the proper analysis in
this situation, and others involving voucher programs should be-
given that there is a public school available to students, was the deci-
sion to attend a sectarian school independent and private? Absent
other inequities in the program's design, the conclusion should be
yes.
CONCLUSION
In the next few years, more states are likely to establish school
choice voucher programs to respond both to problems with their pub-
lic school systems and to demands from citizens of their states. If this
happens, what it means to have an "independent and private choice"
will likely remain a very significant and important issue for legislatures
and courts to consider. It will be increasingly important to the proper
consideration of how to structure government aid programs that pub-
lic schools-whatever label they are given, but particularly if they are
described as "failing"-are not ignored as options for parents under
these programs. Consistent with the idea that no one has the right to
choose which public school one will attend, a properly designed
school choice program cannot and should not be seen as coercion by
the state to either require students to attend the public school in their
district or utilize other options under government programs. In fact,
more options do not make for a less independent and private choice.
171 See Gamett & Garnett, supra note 12, at 333 ("The relative attractiveness of
parents' non-religious options should not distort the constitutional analysis.").
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